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Episode 02 · The Commercial Excellence Podcast

Eliminating Resistance with Roy van Griensven

Roy van Griensven · Head of Commercial Excellence, €7B chemicals

Reading this as a machine? This episode as plain markdown.

What this episode covers

  • The standard playbook described from the inside: a big firm, a nine-figure value case, a program leader hired from the same firm, and two to three years of process, tools, data and restructure.
  • Why the content is usually right, and why execution is where the money goes.
  • The credibility gap: a senior partner who has not held the accountability, then juniors who have never done the job, explaining the job to the person doing it.
  • Why the message lands as "you did this badly" when the truth is that the environment moved.
  • Where ADKAR's Desire stage runs short, and why explaining the benefit from the company's point of view is not the same as asking.
  • What "we interviewed stakeholders" usually means once the plan is already signed off, and why barely acting on the answers costs more than not asking.
  • Stakeholder mapping used to locate resisters, then to change their minds about a plan they had no part in.
  • Extrinsic against intrinsic motivation, and the test Roy applies: what survives the next leader.
  • The menu card instead of one program, and why different business units working on different topics is the design rather than a failure of it.
  • Leading indicators over the lagging number, and how to have that conversation with a board that has to speak to investors.
  • Adaptive capacity translated out of HR language: how much less stuck the company could be.
  • How a safe room is built, why it takes more than one session, and why it does not survive being faked.
  • Ninety-day projects with operator-coaches, and why taking one is optional.
  • The CRM rule that sounds backwards: no system until the team asks for it.
  • What the approach costs, against a consulting bill it can cut by seventy to eighty percent.
  • What Roy would do if he told a board that the people resisted the change.

In this episode

Roy van Griensven has watched the standard transformation playbook run for two decades: a big firm, a nine-figure value case, a program leader hired from the same firm, and two to three years of process, tools, data and training. His verdict on the content is that it is usually right. His verdict on the execution is the reason for this conversation.

He and Jesse Hopps take apart what goes wrong between a correct plan and a company that behaves differently: the credibility gap when someone who has not done the job explains the job, the Desire stage that gets answered with messaging, and what "we interviewed stakeholders" tends to mean once the plan is already signed off.

The alternative he built runs on intrinsic motivation rather than mandate. A menu of capabilities instead of one program, leading indicators instead of the lagging number, ninety-day projects people opt into, and a rule about the CRM that sounds backwards until you see what it produces. It closes on what he would say to a board that was told the people resisted.

Questions this episode answers

What is the standard transformation playbook, and where does it come from?

A large company hears from markets, analysts or its own numbers that it is short of its potential, hires a big consulting firm, and receives a plan that lands well on paper with a nine-figure value case attached. The firm typically supplies the program leader too. What follows is two to three years of process work, tool work, data cleanup, training and some restructuring.

Is the consulting plan itself wrong?

Roy's position is that it is usually correct. The value potential is real, the processes named are genuinely inefficient, the structures are genuinely misaligned and the objectives genuinely are not connected. The problem is not the content. It is what happens when someone tries to execute it.

So why do most transformations fall short?

Because people are not good at being told what to do, and because of who does the telling. The plan arrives as an instruction from someone with no accountability for the result, and the first human response to being told you did a poor job is defense. Most of the time the message is wrong anyway: the environment changed, which calls for something different rather than something better.

What is the credibility gap?

A senior partner may have seen many companies without having been accountable for running one, and the juniors who arrive for execution have not done the job at all. Being told how to run supply chain, operations or sales by someone who has never run them gives people a reason to reject the message, and they will find one.

Why does telling someone the environment changed work better than telling them to improve?

Because it is usually the accurate account and it removes the accusation. In most companies that need a transformation, people did not do a bad job; the conditions moved and something different is now required. Saying so keeps their record intact, which is what makes the next sentence hearable.

What is passive resistance?

People nod and agree in the meeting, then go back to what they were doing the next day. The objection is seldom voiced and rarely escalated. Roy's point is that the people doing it often want the change and agree the opportunity is real; what triggers the response is how it was delivered.

What is transformation theater?

Jesse's term for the visible half of a program running while behavior stays put. Town halls, webcasts, live streams, high participation, people agreeing on the surface, selective adoption underneath, and earnings that do not move the way the case said they would.

What does someone outside headquarters experience?

Roy's version: I have seen all the webcasts, all the live streams and all the town halls, my day-to-day job has not changed at all, I do not understand how this helps me, and nobody has asked me in eighteen months what I think or how I could contribute.

What is ADKAR and is Roy arguing against it?

ADKAR is the change-management model most large enterprises run on, from Prosci: Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability, Reinforcement. He is not arguing against it. His words are that the whole thing makes sense and there is nothing wrong with it. His argument concerns one stage that tends to be under-served in practice.

Which stage of ADKAR falls short in practice?

Desire. Companies explain the burning platform, then explain why the change is good for their people, but from the company's point of view rather than the individual's. Roy's example of what few companies say out loud: this will develop you and make you far more employable anywhere. No company says that, because it wants to keep its talent.

What is missing after the explanation?

The question. Roy says he has hardly seen a company genuinely ask its people what they think needs to happen to get the company where it needs to be. Explaining why someone should want something is a different act from asking them what they would do.

Companies do run stakeholder interviews. What's the difference?

Timing and consequence. The interview usually happens after the approach is decided, and the question is whether you have feedback or concerns. Speaking against a plan the board and the leadership have already signed is not a realistic option, so the answers come back agreeable.

What happens when someone does give a genuinely different answer?

That is the hard case, and Roy names it directly: now a person is proposing something other than what the consultants said to do, and the company has to decide whether to change the approach. Mostly it barely acts on the input, and the credibility loss from asking and not listening is worse than not asking at all.

How is stakeholder mapping typically used?

To identify who is resisting, and then to work out how to change their minds so they get on board with the plan. Roy's objection is the loop inside it: those people are resisting a plan they had no chance to shape, they were asked for ideas, and the moment their idea differed they were treated as wrong by default.

Isn't the person who objects in the town hall just a detractor?

Jesse's read, which Roy agrees with, is the opposite: that is often the person who cares most and can see the plan is not practical. Treating them as a detractor loses the most useful signal in the room, and everyone watching learns what objecting costs.

What is the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation here?

Extrinsic motivation is incentives, hierarchy, career calculation and reluctance to speak up. It works, and it is short-term. Intrinsic motivation is a person believing the thing is worth doing. Roy's framing is that with the first you have to chase people, and with the second they bring you ideas you did not ask for.

What is Roy's test for whether motivation is real?

What survives the next leader. Extrinsic motivation might work for three, twelve or twenty-four months, and then a new leader arrives with a new set of ideas. His question is what you do after, and intrinsic motivation is the answer that does not need to keep being paid for.

What is self-determination theory and how does it apply?

Three psychological needs sit behind intrinsic motivation: autonomy, competence and relatedness. People choose, people feel capable of something challenging but reachable, and the work connects to their daily job and the people around them. Jesse's argument is that a top-down transformation tends to violate all three at once.

How does a top-down program violate all three?

Autonomy goes when people are consulted rather than involved in the design. Competence goes when the ask is either far beyond reach or well beneath their expertise. Relatedness goes when people struggle to see how their day-to-day work changes, and when the peers and bosses around them are visibly not going along with it either.

Can you use the same playbook and get a different result?

Yes, and Roy is specific that you often should. The same content, the same framework, the same examples, delivered as inspiration rather than instruction, with the question of how it applies to their own job left open. His experience is that the outcome is usually the same one the consultants recommended, and it is now their idea.

What is the menu card approach?

Instead of one program deployed everywhere, the center names the twenty or so capabilities that would matter if the company did all of them well, and each business unit picks the two or three that matter to them now. Different units then work on different topics, which is the design rather than a failure of it.

Does that break the one-company principle?

Where the company has to get to stays one thing and is not up for negotiation. What varies is the route. Business units differ in business model, maturity and context, and Roy's argument is that insisting they do not is what produces the resistance leaders then complain about.

Who chooses the capabilities?

The heads of the business units, on the grounds that they are the ones accountable at the end of the quarter and the end of the year for their unit's results. The question put to them is which of the capabilities matter most right now in order to start seeing progress.

What does "academically correct but practically irrelevant" mean?

Roy's phrase for a finding that is true and useless. It is academically correct that twenty capability gaps exist. It does not follow that all twenty are practically relevant today to any given business unit, and treating the whole list as equally urgent everywhere is what makes a correct diagnosis unusable.

Why manage on leading indicators instead of the target?

Because the lagging number tells you quarterly how far short you still are, which is neither steerable nor motivating. Leading indicators show the work is changing something: pipeline value rising in the early stages, conversion from stage one to two up ten percent. Progress is visible while the outcome is still distant.

How do you get a board to accept progress instead of results?

By being straight that they still own the outcome and by supplying something they can steer with. Roy's point is that markets move on visible momentum rather than on whether a five-year number landed, and that leading indicators produce a different quarterly conversation: how far have we moved, is it enough, where do we steer next. It requires an agreed link between the leading indicators and the outcome.

What goes wrong when a board manages only on the lagging number?

Roy is blunt: in a lot of cases numbers get fabricated. If the quarter needs a hundred and twenty, orders get pulled forward so the quarter shows a hundred and twenty. The behavior that follows is a reaction to what is being measured rather than a failure of character.

Is adaptive capacity a real board metric or an HR concept?

Roy's answer is that a direct claim will fail and the qualitative version will land. No CFO will accept that adaptive capacity translates into a specific EBITDA figure. But he estimates nine out of ten boards would say the company is somewhat stuck, and being stuck is the symptom of not having adaptive capacity.

How do you frame adaptive capacity so a board engages with it?

As getting unstuck. Ask any board member whether being able to move past problems faster would raise the likelihood of reaching the target, and Roy's estimate is that a hundred out of a hundred say yes. The framing is not that people need to be made more adaptable; it is that the company needs to stop being stuck.

Why does an individual rarely say they are the one who is stuck?

Because the honest first answer tends to be external: another function did not help, someone else is not doing their job, or it is China, overcapacity, tariffs. Roy accepts that and works around it. Telling someone to get unstuck does not work; the way in is the company owning that it has not equipped them well enough, and then asking what needs to happen.

Why does the leader take the blame first?

Because it opens the door. Roy's opening move is to say the company may not have done the best job of enabling people to do what they need to do, so let us talk about it. It removes the accusation from the room, and it is usually accurate.

What makes a room psychologically safe, in practice?

Peer level, whatever the hierarchy of the people in it, and consistency over time. People need to see that ideas they raised were acted on, that what they said did not come back at them, and that others had the same experience. It arrives across sessions rather than in one, and it does not survive being faked.

How is that different from a town hall?

A town hall is one-way. Information is sent, and questions are invited in a setting where disagreeing publicly with a plan the company has committed to is a career risk. The reflect session inverts both: nothing is being sent, and the point of the room is what the people in it think.

What is inspire, reflect, apply?

Inspire is direction plus examples of what other companies have done, offered explicitly as stimulus rather than as the answer. Reflect is a peer-level room where people work out what matters in their own job. Apply is a ninety-day piece of real work with an experienced coach attached.

Where do the projects come from?

From the people doing the work, with light guidance from the inspire and reflect stages about which topics matter to the company. Taking one is optional: the offer is ninety days of help from credible coaches on a real problem, and if someone says there is nothing there they need, that is an acceptable answer.

Who takes part?

All levels and all roles, from senior leaders through mid-level management to the front office. The peer-level rule in the room applies regardless of the hierarchy of the people sitting in it.

Why not push the CRM rollout directly?

Because no company's actual objective is to implement a CRM. The objective is a fuller pipeline, more opportunities and a better conversion rate. Roy would rather a team that has never managed a pipeline start prioritizing opportunities on paper, because after a while they come and ask whether this could be done in a tool.

Isn't paper a waste of time when the system already exists?

It costs time and buys adoption. Everyone accepts that paper stops working at some scale. The difference is whether the system arrives as a requirement or as an answer to a request, and Roy's experience is that the request produces adoption the requirement does not.

Why do CRM implementations designed centrally struggle?

Because the wrong people design them. The specification comes from those observing and monitoring the work rather than from those doing it. Fields, stages and terminology get settled by people who will not use them, and the people who will are then trained on the result.

How does attitude to the system's flaws change when a team designs it?

Completely, on Roy's account. Handed a predefined design, the human reaction is to look for what to disagree with. Having defined it themselves, a request to rename a field from potential to prospect is met with a shrug, because the terminology was not the point.

Does letting units design their own approach create chaos?

It is the fear that drives standardization, and Roy's read is that the board does not care much about the standard, it cares about the outcome. Standardize-then-roll-out is a way to hold on to something controllable. He also puts the number at around eighty percent of people already knowing what needs to be done.

What if a team wants to do something genuinely wrong?

You guide rather than instruct, and you use the peers. If eight of ten have the right idea, the eight can usually convince the other two, and that carries more weight than one person telling all ten what to do. Guiding the direction is part of the job; specifying the method is not.

Does this survive a change of leadership?

Partly, and Roy will not overclaim it. Visible progress protects it: a new leader looking at something that is demonstrably moving tends to conclude it is not their biggest problem to solve. It still requires leadership behavior, because after a bad quarter the pressure to change course arrives and someone has to hold the line.

Is the approach specific to chemicals, or to this company?

Roy's answer is that the logic is universal and the application is situational. Having worked across industries and companies, he believes the principles carry. What varies is context: how much convincing is needed, whether middle management is the constraint, and whether you are at the start of a transformation or in the middle of a failing one.

What does it cost compared with the conventional approach?

Less. Roy's estimate is that a company can cut consulting spend by seventy to eighty percent by using its own people differently. You may still want a large firm for part of the strategy. Executing it is where the cost falls, because what you mainly need is operator-coaches rather than a program staffed by juniors.

What makes an operator-coach different from a consultant?

They have held the bag in the industry: general managers, heads of sales, people who have done the job at a senior level. They understand why the plan is hard and do not sugarcoat it, and they have no interest in selling more hours. Roy names credibility as the thing that matters most.

What should a leader say to a board when results fall short?

Not that the people resisted or could not execute. Roy's answer is unambiguous: if he said that, in all honesty, he would fire himself. He does not accept that people do not want to change; what varies is how they were involved and how they were motivated.

What about people who genuinely will not engage?

He allows for them and puts them in the exception column, sometimes with something going on outside work. The majority, in his account, have no problem with change. The problem is how the change is brought to them rather than how they are involved in it.

What should a commercial excellence leader do on arriving in the role?

Accept the value potential and the strategy rather than relitigating them: agree that is where the company needs to go. Then open the question of how it gets there, because that is the part the standard playbook settles centrally and the part where the result is decided.

What does he tell a board that wants the traditional approach anyway?

That he will not guarantee the objectives, because too many factors sit outside anyone's control, and that he will stand behind the approach he believes raises the odds. And that if the board wants it done the classical way, he is probably not the right person. He is explicit that a leader should be mentally prepared for that answer.

What is the first thing that has to change?

The leader. Roy's account of arriving is that people told him he was the fourth person to come in saying this. What shifted it was two statements: it is not you, the environment changed, and the first thing I am going to change is how we approach this. That is what generates enough accountability for people to give it a chance.

What is the argument in one sentence?

People do not resist change; they resist the feeling that someone is trying to change them, so the work of a leader is engineering the conditions in which adaptation happens rather than forcing it.

Terms defined in this episode

Passive resistance
People nod and agree in the meeting, then go back to what they were doing the next day. It is social rather than instrumental: the objection is seldom voiced and rarely escalated, which is what makes it hard to see and hard to argue with.
Transformation theater
Jesse's term for the visible half of a program running while the underlying behavior stays put. A great deal of activity, people agreeing on the surface, selective adoption underneath, and earnings that do not move the way the case said they would.
The credibility gap
Roy's account of why advice bounces off. A senior partner may have seen many companies without ever having been accountable for the job, and the juniors who arrive for execution have not done it at all. Being told how to run supply chain, operations or sales by someone who has never run them is what turns a correct plan into an argument.
The Desire gap
Where ADKAR asks for desire and a program supplies messaging. Companies explain why the change is good for their people from the company's point of view, and stop short of asking what those people think needs to happen. Awareness is what messaging reliably produces. Desire comes from somewhere else.
Consulted versus genuinely asked
The distinction Roy draws when challenged on stakeholder interviews. Consulted means the approach is decided and the question is whether you have feedback on it. Genuinely asked means the answer can change what happens. The second is harder, because it creates the problem of what to do when someone proposes something different from the plan the board already signed.
Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation
Extrinsic motivation is incentives, mandates, hierarchy and fear of speaking up. It works, and it is short-term: it has to be funded and watched. Intrinsic motivation is a person believing the thing is worth doing. Roy's test is what happens when a new leader arrives with a new set of ideas.
Self-determination theory
The three psychological needs behind intrinsic motivation: autonomy, competence and relatedness. People choose, people feel capable, and the work connects to their daily job and the people around them. Jesse's argument is that a top-down transformation tends to violate all three at once.
The menu card
Rather than one program deployed everywhere, the center names the twenty or so capabilities that would matter if a company did all of them well, and each business unit picks the two or three that matter to them now. Different units working on different topics is the point, because business models, maturity and context genuinely differ.
Academically correct, practically irrelevant
Roy's phrase for a finding that is true and useless. Twenty capability gaps can all be real without all twenty being relevant to a given business unit this quarter. Treating the full list as equally urgent everywhere is what produces resistance that looks like unreasonableness.
Leading vs. lagging indicators
The lagging indicator is the number in the strategy. Leading indicators are the movements that show the work is changing something: pipeline value in the early stages, conversion from one stage to the next. Roy's argument is that managing on the lagging number tells you quarterly how far short you still are, which is neither steerable nor motivating.
Adaptive capacity
How well an organization absorbs change and keeps moving. Roy's translation out of HR language is the one that works in a boardroom: being stuck is the symptom of not having it, and no board will refuse the question of whether getting less stuck would raise their chances of hitting the target.
Inspire, reflect, apply
The three-part method. Inspire is direction plus examples of what others have done, offered as stimulus rather than instruction. Reflect is a peer-level room where people work out what matters in their own job. Apply is a ninety-day piece of real work with a coach attached.
Servant leadership (in a transformation)
Leading by asking what people need and then being accountable for supplying it, rather than by directing activity. The company owns where it has to get to; how it gets there is open. The cost to the leader is control over what gets worked on next.
Operator-coach
Someone who has held the bag in the industry: a former general manager or head of sales rather than a career consultant. They can be challenged on the hard case and answer from experience, they do not sugarcoat why a plan will be difficult, and they have no interest in selling more hours.
Structured autonomy
Where the company has to get to is given and not up for negotiation. How it gets there belongs to the people doing the work, inside guidance rather than instruction. Roy's version is guided discovery: you do not tell people what to do, and you do guide the direction.
If I would say that, in all honesty, I would fire myself.
Roy van Griensven, asked what a board should make of a leader who says the people resisted
I fundamentally disagree and don't buy into the fact that people don't want to change. It's just the way you get people involved, how you get them motivated.
Roy van Griensven
It's academically correct but in a lot of cases practically irrelevant.
Roy van Griensven, on a list of twenty capability gaps
Stuck is the symptom of not having the adaptive capacity.
Roy van Griensven
In Japan, people start moving not when you touch the head but when you touch the heart.
Roy van Griensven
Extrinsic motivation is never sustainable. It might work for three months, twelve months, twenty-four months. And what do you do after?
Roy van Griensven
The change doesn't happen through a board. It happens through the people itself.
Roy van Griensven
You can't fake your way through this. Fake it until you make it doesn't work in this case.
Roy van Griensven, on building a room people will speak in
You might even use the same content, the same playbook, the same framework. The difference is it's their idea. They came up with it.
Roy van Griensven
If you want to talk to a supply chain guy, a lady in operations, in sales, and you're talking to someone that is telling you how to do your job that has never done that job before, that's a huge credibility gap.
Roy van Griensven
Does any of the board members care about the adoption rate of the system? When they can also trade that for a ten percent increase in our conversion rate.
Roy van Griensven
The first change I will do is by changing what we're going to do and how we approach this.
Roy van Griensven, on the leader moving first
You're engineering the conditions for adaptation to occur naturally, as opposed to trying to force change on people.
Jesse Hopps
Talk is cheap. You've got to demonstrate consistency.
Jesse Hopps
People don't really resist change. They resist the feeling that someone's trying to change them.
Jesse Hopps
Full transcript

The standard playbook, from the inside

Jesse Hopps: Before you led this approach to commercial excellence and transformational growth, what were the more common approaches you saw in Fortune 500 companies when it came to change management? What is the dominant standard playbook?

Roy van Griensven: What you see in many companies over at least the last two decades is that big companies realize they might have a problem. They are not living up to their full potential, which they hear from the markets, the shareholders, the analysts. Or they have an actual problem, because they are declining, not growing, stalling.

The common approach is: okay, we need to adjust our strategy. Let us hire a big consulting firm, because they have done this before with other companies and they can tell us what we need to do. Typically that lands beautifully on paper, with at least a nine-figure value potential attached, and then it is: okay guys, you just need to run a transformation program across multiple streams. In most cases the company then hires one of the consultants in as the program leader, to tell the people in the company what needs to be done.

Traditionally it is the same approach. We look at our processes, we look at our tools, we fix our data, we train people how to do it, we do a bit of a reorganization. That keeps the company busy for two to three years, until the point where you have actually spent a huge amount of money. Initially people are excited, because something is happening and they can be part of it. Over time they realize nothing materially is changing.

In the headquarters there is a huge idea of how we are changing the company. The moment you step out of the headquarters office, people say: I have seen all the webcasts, I have seen all the live streams, I have seen the town halls, but my day-to-day job is not changing at all. I do not understand how it is helping me. And by the way, nobody has asked me for the last eighteen months what I think or how I can contribute.

Where the failure sits

Jesse Hopps: I call that transformation theater. A lot of activity, everyone is very polite, they are nodding along, agreeing with the need for the transformation on the surface level, but they are selectively adopting, or passively resistant. They are not outright rebelling and saying this is a dumb idea, you do not have the process right, you do not get my job. They sort of agree and say yes, of course, we will give that a try. But the behavior does not stick, and the earnings do not lift the way the case said they would.

There is all kinds of data. McKinsey, BCG, they all say the same: seventy to ninety percent of these transformations fail to deliver on expectations. So either we are really bad at setting goals, or the fundamental playbook is the problem. Everybody cannot be executing this badly.

Roy van Griensven: I do not even think the things put on paper by the big consulting firms are bad. The potential is there. There are always these elements: these processes are not okay, the organization structure is not as efficient as possible, objectives are not aligned. It is correct.

The point is in how you execute it. As humans we are not that good at just being told what needs to be done. If someone comes in and tells you that you did a bad job, your first reaction is resistance. You are defensive. That can show immediately, or it can be passive: let these guys talk.

And the problem is that in most cases it is not about people having done a bad job. In a lot of cases where companies need a transformation, the environment has changed, and that means something else is required than before.

The credibility gap

Roy van Griensven: That is what typically fails in the consulting approach. They come in and tell you how to do the job without giving credibility to the people, without saying: you have done a fantastic job so far, we just need something else going forward.

Secondly, the accountability of the people telling you that something else is needed is typically not there. You have a senior partner coming in who might have seen a lot of companies but has not been responsible for doing the job. I have seen very senior leaders say: theoretically, content-wise, you might be correct, but it is not as easy as how you put it on a shiny piece of paper.

And the problem becomes even bigger when you go into execution, because then the juniors come in, and they have zero credibility. They have never done the job. If you want to talk to a supply chain guy, a lady in operations, in sales, and you are talking to someone who is telling you how to do your job that has never done that job before, that is a huge credibility gap.

What I have seen happen is that people then start giving the reasons why the consultant does not understand it, which leads into resistance. They might actually want to change. They might be fully behind the fact that the opportunity is there. But the way it is executed triggers human resistance.

Where ADKAR runs short

Jesse Hopps: The predominant change-management framework came out of Prosci, and it is called ADKAR: awareness, desire, knowledge, ability, reinforcement. Everyone in the Fortune 500 has heard of it or been through a training session on it. On paper it makes sense. Do they know why we need to change, what is the burning platform. Desire, can we talk about what is in it for them, using incentives and implicit punishments. Knowledge, the classroom training. Ability, tools and software. Reinforcement, KPIs and governance. To me that whole paradigm is about managing change, or managing resistance to change.

Roy van Griensven: The whole makes sense. It is correct. There is nothing wrong with it. What I see is that there is one crucial element that is typically failing or under-present, and that is the desire.

The way big companies handle it is: we need to explain the why, what is the burning platform, what does the company need to change. Then companies explain why it is good for the people. But that is where it starts, and it is explained from the company's perspective, not from the individual's.

One very simple example: very few companies would actually say this gives you an opportunity to develop and grow, which gives you a ten times bigger opportunity to find a job at any company. No company says that, because they want to retain their talent.

But then if you move into the desire, hardly any company I have seen or heard of genuinely asks people what they think. What do you think needs to happen to get our company to the point where it needs to be?

Consulted, or genuinely asked

Jesse Hopps: I have to push on this, because people running a PMO will say we consult, we inform, we do stakeholder interviews. What is the difference between consulting and informing and truly getting people's ideas on the table? Is it that they do not act on them?

Roy van Griensven: Two things. The interviews typically happen in a way where we say: this is what we are going to do, what is your feedback, do you have any problem, do you have any ideas. So the idea, the approach, everything has already been decided.

And then, am I going to speak up that I have a different opinion, while the entire company and the board and all the leaders have already signed up for this plan? That is not genuinely asking for people's opinion.

Jesse Hopps: Not very psychologically safe to disagree with the momentum of the rest of the company.

Roy van Griensven: Absolutely the case. But then it is about whether you genuinely start by asking people what they think. And secondly, and this is a very tough thing to do: what now if someone comes back with an idea that is very different from what the company had in mind, based on what the consultants told you that you had to do? What do you then do? Change the approach?

You ask them for the input, but then you are in a dead-end street. That is again where you lose the credibility, because people feel: I have been asked to give input, but nothing happens with it anyway.

Stakeholder mapping, and who gets called a resister

Roy van Griensven: It becomes: we need to tick the boxes. That is what typically also happens with the stakeholder mapping in change management. It is used to identify the people who resist, and that means they resist a plan that they were not able to provide input to.

And then the approach in change management is: how do we change their minds so that they are on board with the plan that we already had? That is strange, right? They have good ideas, you are asking them for their ideas, but the moment they have a different idea, you do not adopt it. You say no, no, no, you are wrong by default.

Jesse Hopps: So everyone is wrong by default. Convincing them, manipulating them, coercing them.

Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation

Jesse Hopps: Walk me through the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as it relates to generating desire that lasts. When we started working together you told me: I do not care what we design, the fundamental design principle is intrinsic motivation. That changed my whole trajectory.

Roy van Griensven: The challenge with extrinsic motivation is that it is short-term, always. You incentivize, and people think: let me get on board with this because it helps me realize the next step in my career. Or I am just afraid to speak up. Or we have a hierarchical culture and therefore we follow whatever it is.

In the end there are cultural differences, but in principle it is the same for everyone. People are more motivated to do anything if they feel it is something they are passionate about, something they are on board with. In Japan, people start moving not when you touch the head but when you touch the heart. The content does not matter so much; what matters much more is whether they feel comfortable with it.

In any other culture it shows in different ways, but it is the same: people get moving the moment they feel I buy into this, I genuinely believe this is the right thing to do. If you look at any transformation, there is a multitude of speed you can get if you do not have to chase people to do it. You do not have to tell them what to do. They will come up with ideas.

The biggest factor in the difference is the sustainability of it. Extrinsic motivation is never sustainable. It might work for three months, twelve months, twenty-four months. And what do you do after? What happens when a new leader comes in with a new set of ideas?

Intrinsic motivation is much more something that lasts, because you do not need to keep encouraging it. But that is a difficult part for organizations. You need to have much more of a servant behavior. How do you serve people? How do you help enable people to do the right thing? The only thing you do as a company is say: this is where we need to go, that is where we need to be. Employees do not get to decide what type of a company we are. But how you get there, that is where the more intrinsic motivation there is, the higher the chance you actually get things to change sustainably.

The three conditions, and the parenting parallel

Jesse Hopps: I am a parent. I have two daughters, and I tried carrots and I tried sticks. What I learned is that the minute you are not there to reinforce or govern, they do what they are going to do. So the real key is that we want them to make good decisions for themselves when we are not around. I have learned to give them choices: do you want broccoli or asparagus, spinach or brussels sprouts. You can choose any one of these, but you have to pick one.

When we started working together the second time, you mentioned this intrinsic motivation piece and I was puzzled by it. I went deep on the behavioral science, and it was really clear. Self-determination theory has been widely validated for a very long time. Three psychological needs. What blew me away was how top-down transformation approaches seem to violate all three.

Autonomy: do people feel they are actually in charge of the choice of how this gets done, not just consulted and informed but meaningfully involved in the design. Competence: do they feel they can develop the skills and mastery required, something challenging but not out of reach, and not below their level of expertise. Relatedness: does this really apply to my everyday work? People often cannot see how their day-to-day job changes. And if the people around them, their boss or their peers or someone with a lot of followership, are not going along with it, they are probably not going to be motivated either.

Same playbook, different delivery

Roy van Griensven: The content itself, the playbooks and the approach, is not bad. The way you execute on it, that is where the difference is.

If you want to change your go-to-market model, you can have a consulting firm figure that out, put it on slides, and then run all kinds of sessions to explain this is what we are going to do. Guys, how are you going to make this work? Get them involved and then monitor whether we are progressing.

Or you could say: we believe these are the three or four topics that are most relevant to our company to achieve our goal. How do you feel that changing our go-to-market model could contribute to that? And by the way, for inspiration, here are some examples of how other companies have done this. It does not mean it is going to work for us. How do you relate that to your daily job?

You might even use the same content, the same playbook, the same framework, but the way you expose people to it is very different. Am I telling you, or am I inspiring you with this could be something, but maybe you have better ideas? In my experience you typically get the same outcome that the consultants said was needed. The difference is it is their idea. They came up with it.

The menu card instead of one plan

Roy van Griensven: The value potential defined by a benchmark or a consulting firm: just adopt it. It makes sense, it is logical. I agree with the strategy, this is possible, that is where we need to go. Now how we get there, that is where we need to have a discussion.

In a lot of companies there is one plan that different regions and different business units all have to follow. If you have a consulting firm coming in, they always have one plan: we start with this topic, then we deploy to the rest.

By nature that is what creates resistance, because a business unit leader says: my business model is not exactly the same as the other one, the maturity in my organization is different, the context is different. In a lot of companies the perception is that these people are always resistant because they always talk about how different they are. You know what? Acknowledge that. Acknowledge that there is a clear difference.

If you tell them we are going to bombard you with these eight programs and train you in one setup, one process, one tool, one data model for the entire company: resistance immediately. The moment you say this is the menu card of things that, if we all do them extremely well, will get us to our maximum value, but in order to make progress we need to talk about what matters most to you. Which of these twenty capabilities in commercial matter most to you right now? And the interesting thing is that different business units then start working on different topics, and that is okay.

Jesse Hopps: Is this your structured autonomy in action? And you are doing this with whom, the general managers?

Roy van Griensven: Heads of the business units. You are accountable at the end of the quarter and at the end of the year for the results of your business unit, so you determine.

Academically correct, practically irrelevant

Jesse Hopps: And where do these capability gaps come from? Are they in the strategy, saying to get from here to there we have to close these gaps?

Roy van Griensven: That is where I sometimes use the phrase: it is academically correct but in a lot of cases practically irrelevant. Academically it is correct that we have capability gaps in twenty different areas. But it does not mean all twenty are equally practically relevant today for each individual business unit or region.

The moment you give them the option to say these five topics not for now, these three matter most, then you immediately hit the point of intrinsic motivation.

Jesse Hopps: You are taking a servant leader's approach. You are not pushing what you think are the top three, you are asking what would move the needle, and then supporting them on closing the gap.

Roy van Griensven: How can I help you work on the two or three most important things that matter most to you in order to get as close as possible to your targets?

Leading indicators, and the board conversation

Roy van Griensven: Nine out of ten, if not ten out of ten companies always focus on the endpoint. How do we get to the north star, how do we get to the full value potential. They make a beautiful plan with lots of ambitions, not a strategy to solve the problems. And then the PMO question is: how far are we, when are we hitting that number?

The problem is we are focusing far too much on a lagging indicator. The moment you take that away and start managing on leading indicators, you start addressing that the ideas people have and the work they are doing is creating change. Take CRM adoption. How do you show that we are actually changing? Focus on early indicators: the value of our pipeline in the first stage of the opportunity pipeline is increasing, we are changing the conversion rate from stage one to two by ten percent. We are progressing.

The outside perspective, investors and markets, they are not looking at whether you hit the number in your five-year strategy. The stock price goes up the moment people see what you put in the strategy starting to happen.

Jesse Hopps: Visible momentum. This reminds me of The Gap and the Gain, by Dan Sullivan. That was a big unlock for me personally. I am an idealist, always measuring forward, measuring what I have left to achieve, never arriving. That book is about measuring backward and looking at how much progress you have made. But how do you convince a board of directors to measure progress instead of end results when they are on the hook for the end results?

Roy van Griensven: Two things. First, go back to the employees. Instead of focusing every quarterly review on how big the gap still is, you say: the work you have done in the past quarter has moved us this much. That is recognition. That is reinforcing intrinsic motivation. We are on the right path, we are making progress, what we are doing is working, let us continue. That is the biggest part, because that is where you need to get your people. The change does not happen through a board. It happens through the people itself.

For the board, in most cases they use the lagging indicator because they need to say something in the quarterly market dialogues with investors. And in a lot of cases numbers are fabricated, because we need to get to a hundred and twenty right now, so let us pull some orders forward. What investors want to see is progress. It is an open dialogue with the board to say: we can keep focusing on the lagging indicator, but then you will only be able to look back and say we did not hit it again, do a better job next quarter. If you look at the leading indicators, how much have we progressed, is this enough, where do we need to steer. It drives a very different dialogue. Having said that, you need the link between your leading indicators and the lagging one to be tight, and the correlation to be there.

Adaptive capacity, or getting unstuck

Jesse Hopps: I have a question about a leading indicator most boards would not consider one. When we were designing this, there was an idea of mindset KPIs, or adaptive capacity as an organization. I was not sure you were going to buy it, or the board, or anybody. Adaptive capacity is an individual's or an organization's ability to metabolize and adapt to change. We are in a more volatile time now, with AI and geopolitics, than we were with the internet. Is that a soft, fuzzy HR metric, or does measuring adaptive capacity at scale correlate to EBITDA impact?

Roy van Griensven: Two angles. Having a dialogue to say our adaptive capacity translates into X EBITDA improvement: never going to happen. The positioning is that this is a crucial enabler to get you to that potential, combined with a lot of other work.

If you put it as a metric and say we are measuring that and therefore there is an X amount of EBITDA, no CEO or CFO will say yes, I fully recognize that. But the moment you have a qualitative dialogue, let me provoke a little: at least nine out of ten companies, the board would say we are a bit stuck as a company. Stuck is the symptom of not having the adaptive capacity.

So the moment you have a dialogue with any board member and say: do you think that if we get a little less stuck, if we are able to move beyond the problems we see faster, that gets us a higher likelihood of reaching our target? I guarantee a hundred out of a hundred board members would say yes.

Jesse Hopps: So the question is how do you get unstuck. Adaptive capacity is part of the solution, but it is not framed as we need to make our people adaptable. It is we need to get unstuck, and we need to get our earnings unstuck from flat or declining.

Selling it internally

Jesse Hopps: How did you sell this internally? We found that McKinsey study on unlocking engagement and innovative behavior. Around seventy-seven percent of people do not feel very resilient and adaptable. But when adaptability and resilience were combined with organizational support and psychological safety, there was a roughly sixfold unlock in engagement and innovation. How did you convince stakeholders that mindset and preparing people for change was worth investing in, rather than a fluffy HR thing you do with leftover budget?

Roy van Griensven: First of all, because it is the way to actually get people on board. The way I have used it is that it is predominantly something the company needs to provide as an enabler. If you ask individual employees, they will never refer to the point that they individually get stuck somewhere. It is always because this function did not help me, someone else is not doing their job, or it is external factors, China and so on.

Everyone can get unstuck, and that starts by the person saying: given everything that is happening, what can I still do today to make a step forward? But it does not work to tell people you just need to get unstuck. So the typical way for me to open the door is to say: we recognize that maybe as a company we have not done the best job of enabling you to do what you need to do. So let us talk about it.

Jesse Hopps: You take ownership of it. It is not you are to blame, it is we are to blame.

Roy van Griensven: And then combine that with providing a safe environment where people feel it is okay to openly share their ideas without immediate ramification. So you build a peer environment, not immediately the manager on top where it needs to be spot on.

Why it is not a town hall

Jesse Hopps: Is this like a town hall, or different?

Roy van Griensven: A town hall is a one-way street of information.

Jesse Hopps: It is: ask any questions, if you dare resist what we are telling you. That is not very psychologically safe. You get the odd person who pipes up, and that is career suicide.

Roy van Griensven: It is.

Jesse Hopps: And that is the negative guy, they are not on board. But to me that is the person with the most passion, who cares about the company, and who sees the train wreck of this thing not being realistic and practical.

Roy van Griensven: Absolutely.

Jesse Hopps: So instead of viewing these people as detractors, you are suggesting leveraging them, listening to them more.

Inspire, reflect, apply

Roy van Griensven: You give people guidance and direction of where the company needs to go. Look, this is what other companies have typically done. That is the inspiration. We are not saying this is what we need to do, it is just to inspire your thoughts about what is potentially possible.

The reflect phase needs to be a safe environment, peer level, even if there is a hierarchical difference among the people joining. You need to bring everyone to that same level of peer dialogue. All ideas are good ideas.

Jesse Hopps: That sounds great, but how do you actually get thirty, forty, a hundred people to open up and be vulnerable about maybe we are not managing the pipeline well, maybe we do not have a process? How do you get them to admit shortcomings publicly? That does not sound easy.

Roy van Griensven: There is a huge element of servant leadership. The moment you go into these sessions you say: we are here to help you with whatever is critically most important, we are not going to tell you, you can pick whatever topic you like, and no one is forcing you to pick a topic if you do not believe it is there. And it needs to be genuine. You cannot fake your way through this. Fake it until you make it does not work in this case.

That safe environment does not arrive in one go. People need to see consistency in how people around them behave. They need to see that we have actually solved one or two of their problems first. Now they are asking for my advice. They are doing that again. I told them something and I see it is not coming back to me.

Jesse Hopps: Talk is cheap. You have got to demonstrate consistency. You cannot do this in a one-time occasion.

Roy van Griensven: And people talk to each other, so they need to hear that what you are saying is true through other people's experiences. The moment they come with a different idea, you have to actually support them with it and not cut them off and say this is different from what I had in mind.

Ninety days, and opting in

Jesse Hopps: So you are engineering the conditions for adaptation to occur naturally, as opposed to trying to force change on people. How do you bridge from reflect to apply?

Roy van Griensven: We keep reinforcing that you do not need to pick any project. We are here to give you an opportunity, in a ninety-day phase, to get help from credible experienced coaches who can help you solve your day-to-day challenges. But if you say there is nothing there that I need, then no one is forcing you.

There is a little guidance from the inspire and reflect stages about the topics that matter to our company, but we let people pivot to the topic that matters most in their own job.

Jesse Hopps: What level are these people?

Roy van Griensven: It ranges from senior leaders to mid-level to front office. All levels, all different roles.

The CRM rule

Jesse Hopps: Let us say there are non-negotiable top-down things, we are all going to SAP, we are all implementing Salesforce. It does not sound like you are pushing those projects on people.

Roy van Griensven: Let me take a CRM implementation. We can tell people we are going to implement the CRM, this is the process, clean up the data, do the training. Or it is a bottom-up approach to achieving the same thing. Because for no company is the objective to implement CRM. The objective is to improve my pipeline, get more opportunities, get the conversion rate up.

So we let people figure out what the biggest challenge is in order to reach that goal, and automatically some come to the point that our pipeline is not filled enough, we do not have enough opportunities. Okay, now what do we need to get there?

We never push for the system, because I would much rather have a team that goes from not managing a pipeline of opportunities to being able to prioritize the right ones and know where to spend time, and do that on paper. Because typically, after they do that for a while, they start asking whether we could do this in a tool.

Jesse Hopps: There is going to be a better way than this.

Roy van Griensven: And again, it is intrinsic motivation. Sure, we have got a system for that. But they are asking for it.

Why centrally designed systems struggle

Jesse Hopps: Why does the pro way fail, compared with letting them use paper and having them ask to configure the enterprise tool when they are ready for it?

Roy van Griensven: I have seen quite a few CRM implementations. Typically it is the wrong people designing the way it works. It is not the people doing the job who need to use it, it is people observing and monitoring the people who need to use it.

And it goes back to intrinsic motivation: people feeling that for me there is a need to do this in a more efficient way. Go back to the board. Does any of the board members care about the adoption rate of the system, when they can also trade that for a ten percent increase in our conversion rate, hence faster time to money, or ten percent more opportunities? Everyone understands that eventually you cannot keep doing this on paper. But getting to that point, the adoption is much easier when people say I am getting fed up keeping this on paper, can we put it in the system.

Jesse Hopps: How does their attitude to the little nuisances change, the data quality, the configuration, the UX, when it is their idea versus pushed on them?

Roy van Griensven: If you come with predefined terminology, stages, design, UX, it triggers a human reaction: let us find what I do not agree with, let us criticize something, why will it not work. I look for the differences versus my own idea. The moment you let people define how they think it should be done, and then you say okay, that makes perfect sense, but instead of calling this potential can we call it prospect: sure, I do not care, as long as it works the way I have in mind. Very different adoption. But you need to allow for that to happen.

Chaos, control, and what the board really wants

Jesse Hopps: That seems crazy to me. If field teams are deciding how to configure their systems locally, does that not breed chaos? Does senior leadership not lose control?

Roy van Griensven: In the end, my experience is that the board does not care about the standard. They care about the outcome. The reason they start using terminology like standardization and harmonization, design first and then roll out, is that they are trying to hold on to something controllable.

And I can tell you, in any company, eighty percent of the people know what to do. They know how it needs to look. They will design it the way it has to be done. But there is a huge factor of fear of not being in control, fear of chaos. That is a job for people in my role: guide people in the right direction. You do not tell them what to do, you let them discover, but you guide them.

If someone wants to do something completely wrong, how do you let them see that it might not be the best idea, or use peers to convince them? If eight out of ten have the right idea, can the eight not convince the other two, rather than someone else telling all ten what to do?

Making it survive the next leader

Jesse Hopps: Leadership changes. I hear a lot in the Consortium: another transformation, another person blowing into town. They cannot even absorb the first transformation before the next one is coming at them. How do you create staying power? Can the organization sustain this if you move on?

Roy van Griensven: I would wish to say it is completely person-independent, and it can be for a certain part, because as long as you are able to show progress, as long as you have people working on the right things, the reinforcement by the individual becomes less important. Even if someone else comes in, they look at it and ask: is this my biggest problem to solve? Probably not, if they see progress.

That being said, it requires leadership behavior. The questions keep coming up. If you have a bad quarter: is there anything else? No, we need to stay the course and keep going, because we see the progress. Persistence, sometimes a bit of patience. There is a role for leadership in that.

Portable, and what it costs

Jesse Hopps: Could you help another organization implement the same behavioral system? Is it universal, and is it affordable?

Roy van Griensven: Having been in different industries and different companies, I one hundred percent believe it is universal, and it does not matter the company or the industry. Having said that, it is situationally dependent on what is needed and how to apply it. In some contexts you need a bit more convincing, sometimes it is more the middle management, sometimes you are at the start of a transformation and sometimes in the middle of a failure. The context matters for how to turn it around, but the logic is very universal.

On the investment, it is quite simple. For any company, I dare to guarantee you can cut down consulting costs by seventy to eighty percent by taking a different approach and asking how we can leverage our own people differently. You might still need one of the big consulting firms to help set a piece of the strategy. But how you then execute it, you can do at a fraction of the cost, because what you mainly need is operator-coaches who can guide with credibility. The credibility of the people is massively important. People who have been there, held the bag in the industry. They get it. They guide people. They do not have an interest in selling more hours.

Jesse Hopps: So not career consultants or guys like me. The people who were general managers, heads of sales, who have done the job at a high level in the industry. They get it, they understand why it is hard, and they do not sugarcoat why the plan is going to be difficult to implement.

I would fire myself

Jesse Hopps: The predominant response I hear when expectations are not delivered on is one of two things: our people resisted the change, or they could not execute. What do you say to a leader who tells the board that? How would a board feel about you as a leader if you said that to them?

Roy van Griensven: If I would say that, in all honesty, I would fire myself.

Because in the end, it does not mean it is easy. There are things you need to do. But I fundamentally disagree and do not buy into the fact that people do not want to change. It is just the way you get people involved, how you get them motivated. There is always the exception, maybe someone with active resistance, someone with something else going on, someone who just wants to sit out the last three years of their career. Those are the exceptions.

The majority has no problem with change. The problem is how that change is brought to them, instead of how they are involved in it. And that is what a leader needs to take on.

You need to say: I have a fundamental belief and an idea of how we can get people involved and get change to actually happen. And if the board does not believe that is the way it should be done, then stand for what you believe in and say maybe I am not the right person. If you want to do it the traditional way, the way we have failed for twenty years, then that is fine, but that is not me. Take ownership and say: I am not giving you a guarantee that all of the objectives will happen, there are so many factors. But for influencing the chances to be as high as possible, this is the way we believe it needs to happen. Then stand for that. And also be mentally okay if people say no, we want to do it the classical way, and be ready to say then probably it is not me.

The leader changes first

Jesse Hopps: People do not really resist change. They resist the feeling that someone is trying to change them. It threatens their ego, their identity, the sense that who they have been until now is not good enough any more. And that is not the case. A lot of the time the environment changed. That was the key insight.

Roy van Griensven: Two things. One, you are spot on: the environment has changed, it is not you. Not your fault.

Secondly, the moment that as a leader you take the first step in changing, that is pivotal. Saying: we are not going to do the same thing you have seen before. When I arrived, people said, this is the fourth person who comes in, I have heard that before, sure, sure it is not going to be different.

So saying, one: it is not you, it is the environment that changed. And secondly: by the way, the first change I will do is by changing what we are going to do and how we approach this. That already generates accountability, so people say okay, this is going to be different. Let us see. Let us give it a shot, maybe.

Jesse Hopps: There is a book on change management that makes exactly that point: if you want real change, change your approach as a leader to doing change first. It starts with us.

Topicspassive resistanceintrinsic motivationself-determination theoryADKARstructured autonomyservant leadershipoperator-coachesleading vs. lagging indicatorsadaptive capacity

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